

Deploying and Verifying Checklists The Keys to Widespread Adoption

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Better user understanding of what is causing the vulnerabilities that are being exploited

- Software defects
 - Fixed with vendor patches
- Lack of technical security controls
 - Security settings made to enable or disable security features of the OS software

Better user understanding of how high level standards tie with technical security settings

- ISO 17799
- COBIT from ISACA
- SysTrust, WebTrust from AICPA
- FISCAM from GAO
- Principles and Practices for Security of IT Systems from NIST
- Standard of Good Practice from ISF

The high level standards are helpful, but incomplete

- They describe "what" to do, but not "how"
- These standards are effective only when accompanied by details on how to implement their requirements

Air Example findin 150 17799 9.7.1 Every logging

Audit logs recording exceptions and other securityrelevant events should be produced and kept for an agreed period to assist in future investigations and access control monitoring.

Audit loos should also include:

- laj luser IIDs
- bil dates and times for logion and log-off
- d) termina liberitizy or location if bossible
- di records of successionand rejected system access artempts:
- ej records of succession and rejected cara and other resource access attempts.

One of several actions needed to implement avent logging on Sun Solaris systems:

catik END_SCRIPT > /etc/init.d/newperf #!/sbin/sn /usn/pin/susys -c v
'/usn/bin/sa/sadc //an/adm/sa/sav/cate + %dv |
END_SCRIPT chown rob: sys /etc/init.d/newperf chroco 744 /etc/init.d/newperf |
nn -f /etc/ro2.b/S2/carf |
nn -s /etc/init.d/newperf /etc/ro2.c/S2/cerf |
/usn/bin/susys -c crontac < REND_ENTRIES |
C,2C,4C * * * * /usn/ib/sa/sa1 |
4E 22 * * * /usn/ib/sa/sa2 -s 0 00 +e 23 59 i 12C0 -A |
END_ENTRIES

Why has it been so difficult to proliferate good security practice?

- Vendors have been shipping systems to users with technical security controls <u>turned off</u>
- Users don't know <u>how</u> to properly configure their systems
- Users are afraid to disrupt operations
 - With patching or security settings

Why else would this be true?

But Users Don't Apply Them				
	Attack date	Advance notice		
SQL Slammer	1/25/03	185 days		
Bugbear	9/30/02	502 days		
Frethem	7/17/02	427 days		
Yaha	6/22/02	402 days		
ElKern	4/17/02	336 days		
Klez	4/17/02	336 days		
Badtrans	11/24/01	192 days		
Nimda	9/18/01	336 days		
Code Red	7/19/01	31 days		
Source: Mc/ Sy	Average: Afee, MessageLa mantec, and So	305 days bs, Microsoft, phos		

Microsoft Issues Patch

Forrester Research Report April 3, 2003

More sharply targeted configuration recommendations

- Different security levels
- Different system roles

Different levels of hardening

- Levels of Security
 - Legacy Level I
 - Enterprise Level II
 - High Level III (Gold Standard)

Different system roles

- Role-based security benchmarks
 - Domain member workstation
 - Domain member server
 - Domain Controller
 - Standalone workstation
 - Standalone server
 - Laptop
 - Bastion Server
 - IIS Server
 - File & Print Server

Benchmarks are needed for:

- Common OS/application combinations
 - Definitive verification of breakage via testing
- Appliances
 - Copiers, scanners, printers, etc.

The importance of broad consensus among security experts


- There is such a thing as too many sources of guidance
 - How are users to choose from among those available?

The crucial role of scoring tools

- Motivate behavior toward more robust security
- Enable tracking of configuration status over time
- Helps communication between security specialists and managment

How about:

- Databases of scores by sector
 - Anyone here want to be on the left hand side of the distribution curve?
 - The CI model works well here



The value of case studies

- (1) Scan a system "out of the box" and list identified vulnerabilities
- (2) Configure the system with the appropriate benchmark
- (3) Rescan the system and note the vulnerabilities remaining

Vulnerability Assessment Case studies

			% of Vuls
<u>Study</u>	<u>System</u>	<u>Benchmark</u>	<u>Eliminated</u>
Solutionary	W2K Server	Level I	85
Citadel	W2K Pro	Level I	81
NSA	W2K Pro	Level II	91
Mitre	W2K Pro	Level II	83 (CVE)
Citadel	W2K Server	Level II	99
Citadel	RedHatLinux	Level I	100

Encouraging progress

- Federal gov't promulgation of CIS benchmarks and tools via FedCIRC
- VISA adoption of CIS benchmarks for its Cardholder Information Security Program's Digital Dozen
- Progress at the vendor level
 - Dell's decision to offer pre-configured W2K systems
 - Top security experts from Microsoft, Sun, HP, Cisco, and Oracle are active on the benchmark teams
 - AOL's decision to work with CIS on an AOL User's benchmark and easy to use implementation tools

Management benefits of using benchmarks and tools

- Substantially reduce the risk of unauthorized intrusion
- Following a recognized patching and configuration standard demonstrates due care against legal liability
- Provides a basis for ongoing measurement and reporting of security status to management
 - FISMA

What will foster better configuration and patching practices?

- Incorporation in procurement req'ts by government and corporate buyers
 - Vendors will ship safer systems
- Compliance required by corporate audits
- Agencies serious about compliance with FISMA req'ts
- Organizational desire to demonstrate due care against potential legal liability

What will foster better configuration and patching practices?

- Insurance premium discounts for demonstrated compliance
- ISP's getting in the game to make compliance with the "Big Four" easy for their customers
 - Anti-virus
 - Firewall
 - Up to date patching
 - Sound configuration practice

